TTIP and Intra-European Trade by Aichele, Rahel et al.
Journal of Economics and Statistics 2016; 236(6): 639–664
Under Debate
Rahel Aichele, Gabriel J. Felbermayr∗ and Inga Heiland
TTIP and Intra-European Trade: Boon
or Bane?
DOI 10.1515/jbnst-2015-1040
Received July 19, 2016; revised September 29, 2016; accepted October 24, 2016
Abstract: The European Union is the world’s deepest free trade zone. Amongst
its members, it has abolished tariffs and lowered non-tariff barriers. This has
led to trade creation within Europe and to trade diversion between EU coun-
tries and outsiders. Deep trade integration and the resulting mutual dependence
has, in the eyes of many, facilitated political integration. The Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will undo some of these effects by means of
preference erosion, so that cross-country trade links within Europe may lose rel-
ative prominence. However, the presence of a rich fabric of regional value chains
in Europe and substantial income effects could counter this development. We
provide insights on the empirical importance of these effects based on a New
Quantitative Trade Model. We show that TTIP could indeed lower trade integ-
ration in Europe since predicted income effects turn out not to be large enough
to overcome the effects of preference erosion. However, there is substantial het-
erogeneity across sectors and countries. One way to minimize preference erosion
would be to promote projects and programs to further deepen the EU’s single
market.
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1 Motivation
After experiencing political oppression and war in the first half of the twentieth century,
Europe undertook to build a new order for peace, freedom, and prosperity. Despite its
predominantly economic content, the European Union is an eminently political construct.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2004)
Through the consolidation of basic production and the institution of a new High Authority,
whose decisions will bind France, Germany and the other countries that join, this pro-
posal represents the first concrete step towards a European federation, imperative for the
preservation of peace.
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schumann (1950)
Schumann made the statement cited above shortly before the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC)was founded in 1951 a crucial precedent for the European
customs union and single market. Almost at the same time, Jacob Viner pub-
lished his book “The Customs Union Issue”, which provides a clear theoretical
justification for the most favored nation clause contained in Art. 1 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and which explains that customs unions
(and other preferential trade agreements) need not be beneficial for insiders and
disadvantage outsiders. By eliminating import tariffs amongst themselves, these
agreements improve the price competitiveness of insiders the partner country,
crowding out exports of outsiders. This trade diversion means that insiders may
start importing from less efficient insiders instead of outsiders. Insiders lose tariff
income, and outsiders suffer a deterioration of the terms of trade.
The US (and, to some degree the UK) welcomed European integration, des-
pite it being potentially harmful for them. Part of the rationale for this reaction
is commonly traced to the ‘liberal peace hypothesis’. Deeper trade integration
fosters political cooperation and reduces the likelihood of conflict; see Schrodt
(2004) for a short survey and Martin et al. (2008) for an empirical analysis. A lot
of time has gone by since the creation of the ECSC; in the EU of today, military
conflicts seem all but impossible. However, recent years have shown that polit-
ical ties within the Union may have been weaker than what many pundits had
assumed: see the event of Brexit and lack of cooperation and solidarity in the
debt or refugee crises.1
1 The empirical literature tests for a correlation between trade links and cooperation using mil-
itary conflicts; however, the theoretical argument (e. g., as put forward by Martin et al. (2008))
applies for other (non-military) types of conflicts as well.
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Figure 1: Intra-EU trade shares over time.
Note: Exports to plus imports from other EU members divided by total trade (exports plus
imports). EU membership expands over time; vertical lines mark the timing of enlargements.
CEEC denotes central and eastern European countries: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estland, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. Trade data fromUN Comtrade.
It may not be entirely unrelated that the intensity of European integration – as
measured by the share of members’ trade within the EU – has peaked in the mid
1990s and has been going down slowly but steadily since then; see Figure 1. The
graph shows the evolution of intra-EU trade shares over time for a number of core
EU members and the UK from 1962 to 2015. Over time, the membership of the EU
expanded from 6 to 28 countries in seven waves of enlargement. Thus, naturally,
the share of intra-EU trade increased. For example, the German share increased
from just about 30% in 1962 tomore than 60% in 2007, when it reached an all-time
high. Since then, the share has fallen back slightly. Similar dynamics are visible in
other countries. The case of the United Kingdom is interesting, too. In the 1960s,
the country’s trade share with EU countries was just about 20%; after the entry
into the EU in 1973, the share quickly increased and peaked in 2006 at about 56%;
since then, it has fallen to below 50%.
From a Vinerian point of view, the falling intra-EU trade share is to be wel-
comed: as trade barriers with other countries fall, for example as a consequence
of China’s entry into the WTO, the discriminatory nature of EU integration
Unangemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.12.18 17:21
642 R. Aichele et al.
decreases. The value of preferences that insiders grant themselves is eroded,
initial trade diversion effects are undone, and additional welfare gains are
unlocked. However, this creeping trade reduction due to preference erosion2
comes with a political cost as the trade ties binding European countries together
become weaker.
For the first fifty years of its existence, Europe pursued preferential trade
agreements with other countries either to prepare their future accession to the
Community, or for political reasons, for example, to help stabilize neighboring
countries in Northern Africa or the Middle East. Only in 2006 did the EU adopt
explicitly economic objectives in its Global Europe Strategy.3 The strategy does
not mention the effects that agreements with third countries would have on
intra-European political ties. The political costs are also largely missing from the
current trade policy debate in Europe.
The European Union is currently negotiating free trade agreements with a
large number of countries, most prominently the US (the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership), Canada (CETA), Japan, India, and the member states of
Mercosur (a customs union in South America). It has already concluded about
three dozens of agreements with third countries, and over time those deals have
become ever deeper and more comprehensive. Ex post and ex ante analyses of
these undertakings tend to show that they are indeed welfare-improving since
the positive effects of trade creation outweigh the negative diversion effects. A
large body of literature makes this point; see Egger and Larch (2011) for an ex
post assessment of the Europe Agreements, Keuschnigg and Kohler (2012) for an
ex ante analysis of the EU eastern enlargement, and Egger et al. (2015), Felber-
mayr et al. (2015a), or Aichele et al. (2016) for an ex ante analysis of the proposed
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
In this paper, we investigate the effects of a potential transatlantic trade
agreement with the US on intra-EU trade. The price competitiveness of US firms
in Europe will increase and allow them to crowd out European competitors. The
value of trade preferences that European competitors enjoy in EUmarkets erodes.
In turn, for the same reasons, European firms will gain market share in the US.
TTIP undoes some of the problematic trade diversion which the creation of the
European Single Market has necessarily generated. Thus, the expectation is that
TTIP would indeed lower intra-EU trade shares due to preference erosion. This is
an important driver of the welfare gains from TTIP.
2 We are thankful to a referee for suggesting this terminology.
3 In a communication, European Commission (2006) views the promotion of growth and
employment as the central objectives of Europe’s trade policy strategy.
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However, there are a number of theoretical ambiguities: First, not all bilateral
links will be similarly affected. It is possible that, for example, higher German car
exports to the US lead to larger exports of car parts, say, from Slovakia to Ger-
many. Moreover, it is possible that domestic (that is, e. g., intra-German) trade
flows absorb the adjustment more than bilateral flows.4 Second, gross trade (as
recorded by conventional trade statistics) may change differently than the value
added contained in those flows. Third, it is possible that intra-EU shares fall while
the level of intra-EU trade does not. The reason is that higher aggregate income
caused by a successful agreement with the US creates more demand for goods
from all countries, including fellow EUmember states. Moreover, theremay be off-
setting effects from increased input trade within the union. In other words, even if
German exports to the US increase at the expense of German exports to France, it
may well be that Germany’s imports of intermediate inputs from France increase.
To the extent that production networks are regional, this effect may mitigate the
political costs of external agreements. To assess these possibilities, simulation of
a quantitative trade model is required.
Existing literature on EU agreements with third parties has rarely looked into
the details of intra-EU trade effects. Often, this issue is side-lined, as, for example,
in the EU Commission’s official study on TTIP by Francois et al. (2013) or in the
analysis of Fontagne et al. (2013). Capaldo (2014) expresses concern about a pos-
sibly negative effect of TTIP on integrationwithin Europe. However, he talks about
trade policy without using a trademodel, so he cannot discuss preference erosion
effects. His analysis does not feature any positive effects of trade on productivity,
prices, or product variety. Rather he employs a very simplistic Keynesian frame-
work which can, at best, shed light on short-run effects. Bauer and Erixon (2015)
forcefully criticize the assumptions of the analysis. In our analysis, we wish to
quantify the importance of the concern about disintegration of the EU and under-
stand the structure of intra-EU trade effects based on a general equilibrium trade
model.
We conduct a detailed analysis of the intra-EU trade effects that TTIP might
bring about. To this end, we use the quantitative trade model developed by
Aichele et al. (2014) and recently revised in Aichele et al. (2016). This model
builds on the work of Caliendo and Parro (2015), which in turns generalizes
the stochastic Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to many
industries connected by domestic and international input-output linkages. Com-
pared to the standard computable general equilibrium (CGE) models offered, for
4 Indeed, Yotov and Zylkin (2014) show econometrically that free trade agreements lead to trade
diversion, and that diversion of trade away from the domestic market is stronger than from
foreign countries whose relative trade costs do not change due to the FTA.
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example, by the GTAP consortium (Hertel 1997) or CEPII (the MIRAGE model,
Fontagne et al. (2013)), our framework falls into the class of New Quantitative
Trade Models (NQTM; Costinot/Rodriguez-Clare (2014)): these are simpler models
which require much less data, whose theoretical properties are well understood,
and which can be structurally estimated.5
The policy scenario assumes that, besides eliminating tariffs, a transatlantic
trade agreement lowers trade costs between the parties by as much as other
deep trade agreements whose effects are already reflected in global pattern of
trade. This counterfactual analysis is embedded into data for the year 2011, since
more recent comprehensive data is not available. Therefore, we analyze potential
effects, not forecasts (which would have to project the data forward to the date at
which TTIP is fully operational and also take into account political feasibility con-
straints). Nonetheless, our methodology allows detecting structures which would
presumably also prevail in other large-scale trade agreements of the EU.
Complementing other papers, we distinguish between gross trade flows and
value added trade flows as defined by Johnson and Noguera (2012), using the
tools for counterfactual analysis of value added trade and production networks
developed by Aichele and Heiland (2016). Our analysis thus captures the fact
that TTIP induced growth in bilateral trade between a pair of countries as meas-
ured at customs implies an increase in value added imports from third countries
which supply intermediate goods at earlier stages of the production process.
Changes in intra-EU value added trade patterns may thus differ from the changes
in gross trade transaction values recorded at customs, depending on the sourcing
structure of countries and sectors involved.
Recently, Krebs and Pflüger (2015) have also studied TTIP using a general-
ized version of the same model framework. These authors introduce land into the
model, allow for labor mobility, and analyze regional effects within Germany. The
policy scenario, however, differs from ours, as the authors propose a large inter-
val of possible trade cost reductions. Carrere et al. (2015) also use a multi-sector
Ricardian model to study the potential effects of TTIP; they introduce frictional
unemployment but do not introduce intermediate inputs.6
Our simulation delivers a number of important insights. First, TTIP would
indeed reduce EU countries’ intra-EU trade shares; domestic trade is less severely
affected than bilateral trade. Second, those shares would fall not only because
5 However, NQTMs have to imposemore structure. For example, themarket structure is assumed
to be the same across all sectors.
6 Other studies on TTIP, such as Francois et al. (2013) or Fontagne et al. (2013) have used more
conventional CGE tools where parameter estimation and theoretical modeling are not as closely
intergrated as in NQTMs.
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overall trade of EU members increases, but also because intra-EU trade flows
fall in absolute value, at least in most cases. Hence, trade creation effects due
to higher income do not suffice to overturn trade reduction caused by preference
erosion. Third, whether one looks at the dynamics of bilateral trade flows using
transaction values (gross trade) or using the value added content of these flows
does not change the overall picture. Fourth, there is substantial heterogeneity
among EUmembers and industries. Disintegration effects are stronger in bilateral
relations involving Germany or the UK, and the chemicals, metals, and transport
sectors are more affected than others. Fifth, supply networks will change as pro-
ducers from the US become more important as suppliers of intermediate inputs
for European producers. In the manufacturing sectors, the US’s gains are mostly
absorbed by smaller flows between EUmember states. In the services sectors, the
US’s gains are mostly absorbed by smaller intra-national flows.
TTIP meets strong resistance from the public. However, the negative views on
the agreement have little to do with the integration effects we wish to highlight in
this paper. Rather, they relate to a wide-spread suspicion that TTIP could erode
consumer and worker rights and limit governments’ rights to regulate. We do not
address these concerns, but add another one: TTIP would very likely weaken
political cohesion in Europe. However, one needs to be very clear about two
points. First, from a purely economic point of view (and studied through the lens
of a classical trade model), TTIP is clearly beneficial. Even if one could monetize
the costs of weaker political integration, it is not clear whether these costs out-
weigh the benefits. Second, there are still important trade barriers within Europe
which lower the degree of integration. Rather than complaining about preference
erosion due to TTIP, it would be better to engage in policies aiming at undo-
ing those barriers. This is all the more important as intra-EU trade shares are
bound to fall, even if TTIP never materializes, since other big trade agreements
and technological change continue to erode the value of EU trade preferences.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly
discuss the simulation model and its main characteristics. In Section 3 we per-
form our counterfactual analysis. Section 4 provides some discussion of policy
conclusions.
2 Methodology
We use a version of the stochastic Ricardian model developed by Caliendo and
Parro (2015). This setup is probably the simplest large-scale NQTM which allows
for rich international and domestic input-output linkages across many industries
and countries. The model builds on Eaton and Kortum (2002) who have extended
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the well-known Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson model of 1977 to many countries
separated by geographical or political frictions. The trick is to employ a prob-
abilistic formulation of technological heterogeneity. In each sector, there is a
continuum of varieties; the efficiency to produce any such variety in any country
is determined by a draw from a Frechet distribution. The locational parameters of
these Frechet distributions differ across countries and sectors and pin down abso-
lute advantage; their shape parameters, held constant across countries, govern
the degree of heterogeneity in comparative advantages.
With these assumptions, the model gives rise to sectoral gravity equations
which can be easily brought to bilateral trade data. In particular, using tariff
data, one can estimate the shape parameters of the Frechet distribution (these
turn out to be identical to conventional trade elasticities), and the treatment
effects of existing free trade agreements (possibly of varying depth). Conveni-
ently, the model can be solved in changes (the so called “exact hat algebra”; see
Dekle et al. (2007)). This means, that certain constant model parameters – such
as those describing the sector-country levels of absolute advantage – drop out
and need not be calibrated, which makes numerical implementation much easier
and reduces errors due to mismeasurement. Assuming that production functions
are Cobb-Douglas in labor and in various intermediate inputs, the cost shares
implied by the model can be straight-forwardly matched with cost shares from
conventional input-output tables. From which countries these inputs are sourced
is determined by themodel, as countries import only goods with the lowest prices
(inclusive of trade costs).
Admittedly, this model is stylized. However, it shares its main characteristics
with a broader class of NQTMs which give rise to a gravity equation, including the
even more simplistic Armington model of national product differentiation used
in the conventional CGE models and the Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous
firms; see Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014). Conditional on observed changes
in openness (and keeping central assumptions on preferences and production
constant), thesemodels even give identical welfare results. They give rise to differ-
ent quantitative predictions in an ex ante framework like ours, but the structure
of these predictions is very similar.7
7 Table 1 in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) compares different models and shows that, for
a sample of 40 countries, our model (perfect competition with multiple sectors and intermediate
inputs) generates global gains from trade (27%) that lie in the uppermiddle of the range obtained
from various setups (4% to 40%). In general, our Ricardian model generates only somewhat
smaller welfare effects than a model with monopolistic competition and firm selection would
(Felbermayr et al. 2015b). In particular, because productivity differences between the EU and the
US are relatively small, we expect only relatively small welfare gains from TTIP.
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The model features two types of trade costs: tariffs and resource-wasting ice-
berg trade costs. Reducing either by the same proportional amount changes the
relative price competitiveness of countries in the same way; however, welfare
effects are very different. The reason is that the reduction of iceberg costs leads to
first-order effects due to resource savings; these effects are always positive even
if terms of trade move against the liberalizing country, and they are proportional
to the trade volume affected by the measure. Reducing tariffs, in contrast, yields
no resource savings; they come together with redistribution from the government
to consumers. Therefore, gains are of second-order; they can even be negative
if tariffs are very low to start with (as negative terms-of-trade effects dominate
beneficial efficiency gains).
Regardless of the exact microfoundation, trade cost reductions between a
set of countries (the EU member states and the US) leads to higher trade costs
between them (trade creation), but might divert their trade away from countries
whose trade costs have not changed (trade diversion). When tariffs are small,
trade diversion leads to little loss in tariff income, and the beneficial trade cre-
ation effects outweigh the detrimental diversion effects for the insiders and,
typically, on the global level. How third parties are affected depends on whether
they compete in similar sectors. If not, third countries benefit fromhigher incomes
as demand for their goods from insiders to the FTA goes up (and their terms of
trade improve). If they do compete, the negative trade diversion effects dominate
(and their terms of trade fall).
The model is calibrated with data from the GTAP consortium. The data cover
140 countries and 38 sectors, including 13 services sectors.8 It provides consistent
input-output tables, sectoral value added and output data, and bilateral sectoral
trade data for the base year 2011.9
3 Simulation results
3.1 The TTIP scenario
Our approach differs from other quantitative exercises on TTIP (for example,
Francois et al., 2013, or Krebs and Pflüger, 2015) in that the definition of the
scenario for the comparative statics analysis is data-driven: We exploit the gravity
8 Note that the GTAP 9 database features 57 sectors. We aggregate some agricultural and
food sectors to reduce the number of parameters that need to be estimated and to reduce the
computational burden.
9 Note that exactly the same model calibration underlies the results presented in Aichele et al.
(2016), which constitutes an update of Aichele et al. (2014).
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equation to estimate the trade cost effects of existing trade agreements – differen-
tiated according to their depth – and assume that trade cost reductions across the
Atlantic could have a similar quantitative and cross-sectoral structure. Clearly,
this is a strong assumption. However, in the absence of a fully negotiated text,
we view this as the best possible strategy to obtain reasonable expectations on
the reduction of costs associated to NTMs. It makes sure that the scenario is feas-
ible, as it is based on the ex post analysis of existing agreements. And it makes
expert judgement on the size of realistic trade cost reductions, which is necessar-
ily ad hoc, redundant. The downside, of course, is that we provide information
about the potential of TTIP, and shy away from assessing whether it is realistic
that transatlantic trade liberalization can actually deliver as much as other deep
agreements (such as the agreements of the EU and the US with Korea or with a
number of South American countries, NAFTA, or the EEA) have. For this reason,
we want our results to be considered as potentials, and not as forecasts or predic-
tions. We take estimates of these NTM cost reductions from Aichele et al. (2016).
In our scenario, we also assume that all bilateral tariffs between the EU and the
US are eliminated. Figure 2 shows the sectoral details.10 Tariff reductions aremost
sizeable in the areas of wearing apparel or animals. In many other industries they
are already fairly low. In the services industries, there are no tariffs.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are assumed to fall as in other deep trade agree-
ments. In the services sectors, the implied trade cost reductions vary mostly
between 5 and 25%, in somemanufacturing sectors they aremore substantial. The
variance in potential NTM cost reductions across sectors makes sense: Bottom-
up estimates such as in Francois et al. (2013) and Egger et al. (2015) also report
larger cost savings potentials in manufacturing than in services; within manufac-
turing the automotive sector (20%), wearing apparel (28%), and metals exhibit
large effects while chemicals or machinery show relatively small ones. This is also
in line with bottom-up studies. The large effect measured for ferrous metals is,
however, an outlier.
Also, the estimates for agriculture and raw materials are somewhat prob-
lematic with relatively high variance and low NTB reduction potentials. Not all
coefficients in Figure 2 are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. This is
so for animals (where the coefficient also has a wrong sign), forestry, fishing, and
mining.11 These sectors account only for a small share of global trade.
10 The tariff changes in displayed in Figure 2 reflect sectoral averages of the changes faced by all
TTIP countries. In the simulations, the US and the EU countries will be affected asymmetrically
because of different external tariffs and because of different weights in the calculation of sector-
level averages.
11 An open question in the literature is about how to deal with parameter uncertainty. In Aichele
et al. (2016) we bootstrap confidence intervals for endogenous variables; however, these turn
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Figure 2: The TTIP scenario: average trade cost reductions across sectors, ad valorem trade cost
equivalents.
Note: For each of the 38 sectors, the graph shows the import-weighted average sectoral tariff
reduction (averaged across the US and the EU) and the sectoral reductions in non-tariff trade bar-
rier as measured in other deep trade agreements; see Aichele et al. (2016). The sector Dwellings
is not shown because it has no recorded trade flows.
Our ambition is tomap the potential effects of TTIP on intra-EU trade; for this pur-
pose, we find the top-down approach described above sensible, since it reflects
experiences with existing FTAs and reveals cross-industry heterogeneity which
is broadly plausible. Alternatively, we could have assumed some arbitrary cut
in NTMs, or follow the bottom-up approach. It is important to notice that these
choices would make little qualitative difference.
3.2 TTIP: macroeconomic effects
Before we move to intra-EU trade effects, we briefly comment on the macroeco-
nomic effects of TTIP. Figure 3 shows the simulated effects of a transatlantic trade
agreement on real per capita income and aggregate trade openness in EU coun-
tries. The estimates are largely in line with findings presented by WTI (2016) or
out to be relatively narrow. So, we follow Caliendo and Parro (2015) and simply use parameter
estimates at face value.
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Figure 3: Effects of TTIP on real per capita income and openness.
Note: The figure shows population-weighted effects of a transatlantic trade and investment part-
nership on EU members. Openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by two
times GDP.
Krebs and Pflüger (2015).12 In all countries (and, a fortiori, in all the aggregated
regions shown in the Figure), openness goes up. Hence, trade creation effects
between the EU and the US dominate trade diversion with third countries and
preference erosion effects within the EU. This holds whether openness is cal-
culated in terms of transaction values (as in the figure) or in terms of foreign
value added absorbed domestically. In the absence of tariff income, an increase
in the latter would be a sufficient and necessary condition for a preferential trade
agreement to be welfare improving; see Arkolakis et al. (2012). In our context, the
existence of tariff revenue effects complicates the picture, but since initial tariffs
are low, their quantitative relevance is low, too; see Felbermayr et al. (2015b).
However, our simulation results suggest that all EU member states stand to
benefit from TTIP, albeit at different amounts.13 The strongest gains are to be
12 These results are smaller than in some of our earlier work (Aichele et al., 2014 or Felbermayr
et al., 2015a). This is entirely due to a different calibration and a more modest scenario rather
than to a different modeling strategy.
13 Note that this is not a necessary outcome, as terms of trade can move against member states
such that they lose from the agreement despite resource savings from lower iceberg trade costs.
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found in Ireland and the UK, where existing trade links are strong, and a reduc-
tion in trade costs has important first-order effects. In this region, real per capita
income is reckoned to increase by about 0.7%. The Benelux countries, which
are also strongly integrated across the Atlantic, feature gains of slightly more
than 0.5%, followed by Austria and Germany with gains of a bit less than 0.5%.
In Scandinavia, the Mediterranean countries, the Baltic states, and the Central
and Eastern European countries (CEEC) the gains range between 0.3% and 0.2%.
As in Krebs and Pflüger (2015), countries with high initial trade shares benefit
more strongly from TTIP as a larger share of their trade volume benefits from
resource-saving trade cost reductions.
3.3 Bilateral trade effects of a deep TTIP
Status quo of intra-EU trade. Table 1 shows the bilateral trade links amongst the
EU countries (or groups thereof) in our data. The upper half of the table looks at
exports as recorded by official statistics (gross trade). The second half looks at
value added transfers through trade. Both are measured in billion US dollars and
refer to our base year 2011. The right-most column presents the share of exports
to other EU members of the countries listed in the left-most column. The lowest
row in each of the two halves denotes the share of imports of each country listed
on the column head from other EU countries. Diagonal elements refer to trade
within the countries (or groups of countries). The intra-EU shares do not include
intra-national trade (but they do include all trade between EU countries).
The value added content of trade flows is computed based on the model.
Using the factual input-output data, and assuming Cobb-Douglas sectoral pro-
duction functions together with the (common) assumption, that, in each sector,
the share of inputs from one country is equal to that country’s share in total
imports, the model can be used to predict value added trade flows.14
Table 1 shows that Austria and Germany (AUT & DEU) export goods and ser-
vices worth 134.7 bn USD to France, they import goods and services worth 108.5
bn. In value added terms, trade flows are substantially lower. Austria and Ger-
many transfer value added worth 84.4 bn USD to France and receive value added
transfers worth 64.3 bn. The difference is due to double counting in the (gross)
flow data based on transaction values: French imports fromGermanymay contain
inputs from France or other countries. The more countries rely on international
sourcing, the larger turns out the gap between gross and value added trade flows.
WTI (2016) show one single losing EU member: Malta. Krebs and Pflüger (2015) study regions
within Germany; they find that all regions benefit. Again, this result is by no means automatic.
14 For more details on the computation of value added flows see Aichele and Heiland (2016).
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The share of French exports to other EU countries is 57.9%; the share of
its imports from other EU countries is 47.5%. In value added terms, the shares
are 51.5% and 55.8%. Clearly, gross exports (measured at transaction value) to
EU countries are larger than when measured in terms of their value-added con-
tent, the opposite is true for imports. A similar pattern emerges for Austria and
Germany. This implies that those countries imports from third countries con-
tain substantial amounts of value added originating from Europe, while exports
contain a substantial share of value added that originated outside the EU.
Effects of TTIP on intra-EU trade flows. Table 2 shows how bilateral intra-EU
trade flows change with TTIP. The emerging picture is quite uniform: all but two
cells feature entries with negative signs.15 The level of intra-EU trade is predicted
to fall, and the share of intra-EU trade in total trade is predicted to fall even
more strongly. This result shows that the trade agreement will indeed lead to a
reduction of trade due to preference erosion: before the agreement, intra-EU trade
was high because tariffs and other trade barriers kept US competitors out of the
market; after the agreement, EU producers lose market share to American pro-
ducers, but they gain market share in the US. The increase in transatlantic trade
will also tend to reduce intranational trade. As production expands in the EU,
demand for labor goes up and so do wages. The wage increase reduces EU produ-
cers’ competitiveness in their home market, in each others’ markets, and in third
countries.
Both gross flows and value added flows between EU members are bound to
decline with the agreement. Quite strikingly, the rates of change in value added
flows are larger (in absolute values) than the rates of change in gross trade flows.
This is a strong indication that the transatlantic agreement will affect the struc-
ture of production networks: For example, rather than sourcing car parts from
France, German car manufacturers will now increasingly turn to the US. While
this is also reflected in smaller intermediate goods flows from France to Ger-
many in gross terms, the fact that trade cost reductions and, therefore, the US’s
gains in trade shares, are particularly strong in the manufacturing sectors where
foreign value added content shares are disproportionately large, implies that
aggregate intra-EU value added trade is more affected than aggregate gross trade
flows.
Interestingly, the entries on the diagonal (intranational trade) tend to be
smaller in absolute value than the off-diagonal elements (international intra-EU
15 BENELUX trade with CEEC and ClubMed countries is predicted to go up. This has to do with
the role of entrepot trade in the Netherlands; value added trade between these pairs falls about
as strongly as between other pairs.
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trade) and the differences in growth rates between intranational gross and value
added flows are much less pronounced. This reflects the relative importance of
services in national value chains. Domestic trade shares in services are very high
due to large trade barriers, and the potential reduction of these trade costs due
to the TTIP are also relatively small. Hence, intranational trade is less affected by
trade diversion.
The largest changes in bilateral gross trade flows are found between
AUT&DEU and their trade partners, and between UK&IRL and their trade part-
ners. Again, this has to do with those countries’ position in the regional value
chain.
Sectoral Impacts. Next, we dive deeper into industry-level details. Figure 4
selects the 25 industries in the EU with the highest exports. The three most
important industries are chemicals, other machinery, and motor vehicles, with
intra-EU gross trade flows roughly worth of 600, 500, and 400 bn USD, respect-
ively. Value added trade flows are substantially lower than gross flows, which
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Export growth Value added growth
Figure 4: Sectoral intra-EU trade changes with TTIP.
Note: The figure shows intra-EU sectoral exports and the corresponding sectoral value added
exports (in bn USD, left scale). It also shows the expected changes thereof with a deep TTIP (in%,
right scale). The figure only shows the EU’s 25 most important sectors in terms of export values.
Intra-EU trade refers to trade flows among the current 28 EU countries.
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share is fairly large. In these three industries, our simulations suggest that TTIP
will reduce intra-EU gross trade by between 1% and 2%. As before, changes in the
value added content of trade flows are much more pronounced. In the areas of
chemicals and motor vehicles these changes are close to –3%.
The business services sector is the EU’s fourth most important industry. Here,
gross trade is smaller than value added trade because of the sector’s upstream-
ness. Manufacturing output often contains a large share of services inputs, so that
services are traded indirectly across EU borders. However, US providers of busi-
ness services will gain market shares in Europe; and this will show up in the form
of a 3% reduction in intra-EU transfers of value added from this sector.
There are a number of industries where the effect of TTIP on intra-EU flows of
gross trade is positive, but the effect on value added trade is negative. Gross trade
of financial services is predicted to grow by about 1%, but the value added content
of this trade is bound to fall by about 4%. The reason for this outcome is that the
positive effect of TTIP on overall economic activity in the EU will increase the
demand for financial services from London or Luxembourg, but the importance
of European value added in these services flows will fall at the expense of US
providers.16
3.4 European supply chain effects and production networks
Now, we turn our focus toward the effects of TTIP on the supply networks of
European producers. For each sector in every region, we measure the share of
value added sourced from a certain region for the production of final goods. That
is, we consider a source region’s share in the total value added embodied in inter-
mediate goods (“processed value added”) that enters some other region’s sectoral
production of final goods.17
To illustrate the effects of TTIP on the structure of these supply networks, we
describe the status quo in the data and illustrate the changes induced by a transat-
lantic trade agreement. We start with manufacturing and focus on the whole of
Europe. Figure 5 shows that the largest share of value added contained in exports
of European countries (to any other country) originates from the country in which
the final production step takes place. On average, about 40% of upstream valued
added falls into this category. The share is highest in industries which strongly
16 In existing deep trade agreements, there have been substantial trade cost reductions in the
financial sector. In the case of TTIP, however, chances are high that the financial sector will be
excluded altogether from the agreement.
17 See Aichele and Heiland (2016) for more details on the definition and computation of this
network measure.
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Figure 5: EU’s supply networks in manufacturing.
Note: The figure shows for each downstream manufacturing sector how much value added the
EU28 processes from other regions (in % of the totally processed value added), summing over
all upstream sectors. Intra-national refers to downstream value added that is processed in the
same country. Core are Germany and its neighbors France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Denmark, Poland, and Czech Republic. CEEC are all Central and Eastern European countries in
the EU excluding Poland and Czech Republic. ClubMed is short for Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta,
Portugal, and Spain. EFTA are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Other EU are
Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and UK.
rely on locally sourced raw materials, such as the paper or meat industries. It is
lowest in industries which rely on imports of raw materials such as fuel products
or metals. It is also relatively low in industries which are very strongly integrated
into international production networks such as motor vehicles.
Industries differ significantly with respect to the share of processed value
added imported from outside the EU (except from the US). Not surprisingly, this
share is highest for fuel products. It is also relatively large for metals. Value added
from the US does not play an important role in any of the industries. It exceeds 5%
only in the transport equipment industry and is substantially lower in the other
manufacturing sectors. In contrast, the share of processed value added originat-
ing from other EU countries is around 40% on average. Expectedly, the largest
share originates from the core EU countries which also make up the largest part
of EU GDP. For example, in the motor vehicles industry, value added imports
Unangemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.12.18 17:21

























































































































































Figure 6: Changes in EU’s supply networks in manufacturing.
Note: The figure shows for each downstreammanufacturing sector how the share of value added
the EU28 processes from other regions summed over all upstream sectors changes with TTIP (in
percentage points). Intra-national refers to the share of downstream value added that is pro-
cessed in the same country. EU28 refers to downstream value added that is processed in other
EU28 countries.
from the core countries amount to almost 30% of total foreign-sourced value
added.
Figure 6 reports the simulated changes in the shares of value added sourced
from different regions after the conclusion of TTIP. Across all 19 manufacturing
industries, a common pattern emerges: The share of processed value added ori-
ginating from the same EU countries in which the final production step takes
place falls by about half a percentage point, the share of value added sourced
from other EU countries falls by 0.5 to 1 percentage points. The US’s share goes up
by 1 to 2 percentage points. In all cases, the US gains more than the EU countries
(including intra-national suppliers) lose. This reflects trade diversion pertaining
to countries outside of TTIP.
The industries experiencing the largest shifts are chemicals, motor vehicles,
and transport equipment, where US suppliers gain about 2 percentage points,
mostly at the expense of intra-EU suppliers. In the other metals industry, the US
gains a similar share, but here third countries lose relatively more than in other
areas.
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Figure 7: EU’s supply networks in agriculture and services.
Note: The figure shows for each downstream agriculture and service sector how much value
added the EU28 processes from other regions (in % of the totally processed value added),
summing over all upstream sectors. Intra-national refers to downstream value added that is pro-
cessed in the same country. Core are Germany and its neighbors France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, and Czech Republic. CEEC are all Central and Eastern European
countries in the EU excluding Poland and Czech Republic. ClubMed is short for Cyprus, Greece,
Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. EFTA are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
Other EU are Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and UK.
Figures 7 and 8 provide similar illustrations for the EU agricultural and services
industries. In many services industries, the share of domestic (intra-national)
supply of value added exceeds 50%. Air, sea, and other transport services are
exceptions. In those areas, suppliers from outside of Europe and the US play
important roles since transportation services are often provided in connection
to the international trade of final goods. For very different reasons, a similar
pattern is visible in the energy sectors (electricity, gas), which rely on imported
resources.
The simulations reveal that with TTIP the US could become substantially
more important as a supplier of value added for final goods production in the
EU. This is most visible in the area of financial, insurance, and transportation ser-
vices, as well as for grains & crops. As with the manufacturing industries, in both
services and agricultural production increasing US shares are compensated for by
decreasing shares of intra-national and other EU suppliers.
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Figure 8: Changes in EU’s supply networks in agriculture and services.
Note: The figure shows for each downstream agriculture and service sector how the share of value
added Germany processes from other regions summed over all upstream sectors changes with
TTIP (in percentage points). Intra-national refers to the share of downstream value added that is
processed in the same country. EU28 refers to downstream value added that is processed in other
EU28 countries.
4 Conclusion
Many consecutive steps towards an integrated Europe, most prominently the cus-
toms union formation in 1969, the Single European Act of 1987, the creation of the
European Monetary Union in 1999, and the Schengen Agreement in 1995, have
contributed towards lowering trade costs within Europe. These steps have also
yielded an important political dividend: By making European economies depend
more strongly on each other, economic integration has increased the incentive
for cooperation. Mutual dependence may also have instilled a feeling of solidar-
ity which justifies substantial net payments of some of the richer countries into
the central EU budget.
Since 2006 the EU has been pursuing an activist trade policy with the
objective to contribute to growth and employment in Europe. It has singled out
large trade partners such as the US, Japan, Mercosur, or India, and started to
engage in trade negotiations with these countries. Clearly, the formation of trade
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agreements with large partners bears economic promise. However, as we argue in
this paper, such agreements erode some of the trade preferences that EU coun-
tries have granted each other. Deep trade agreements with other countries will
undo some of the intra-EU trade creation and weaken within-EU integration.
These external agreements reduce the distortions that are inherent to preferential
trade liberalization. However, one may also argue that relatively weaker trade ties
amongst EU countries will have political economy repercussions in other areas of
European politics.
There is strong empirical evidence providing support to the hypothesis
that closer economic integration increases the likelihood of cooperation; see
Martin et al. (2008) and Martin et al. (2012) for recent examples studying military
conflict and Egger et al. (2011) and Egger et al. (2013) for the link between cooper-
ation in trade and environmental questions. Also, a casual look at Europe lends
credibility to this hypothesis: from the 1960s on, ever closer political union in
Europe was accompanied by an increase in intra-EU trade; however, since about
1995 intra EU-trade is stalling or falling (for example, for the UK).
We do not wish to pretend that political integration is a function of trade
integration alone. Labormarket integrationmight actually lead to disunity, in par-
ticular when it involves low skilled individuals such as in the mass migration of
Eastern Europeans to Britain from 2004 onwards, or in the current refugee crisis.
Similarly, the European debt crisis and its handling has led to an erosion of trust
and solidarity. We also do not deny that it is quite possible that megaregionals,
such as TTIP, breed discord, as EU member states seem to have very hetero-
geneous preferences regarding their negotiation priorities and reservations. The
latest Eurobarometer poll, for instance, suggests that majorities in Germany and
in some of its neighboring countries (in particular in Austria) are strongly opposed
to TTIP, while there are large majorities in favor, for example, in Scandinavia, or
in Southern and Eastern Europe.
However, when countries depend less and less on their regional neighbors for
their economic well-being, it is very likely that their incentives to make conces-
sions in a regional political club such as the EU will not increase. As economies
diversify their trade patterns away from Europe, their interest in Europe falls. It
is well possible that increasing disunity amongst European countries in the last
years is, amongst other things, driven by this phenomenon.
Given this diagnosis, it looks like a paradox that the European Union is act-
ively pushing for ambitious trade deals with third countries. However, it is in a
strategic dilemma: To remain attractive to member states and citizens, the EU has
to foster a climate conducive to growth; trade deals are an instrument. At the same
time, such deals necessarily weaken the degree of economic integration within
the EU.
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One way to square the circle is to strike a balance between the deepening of
intra-European economic relations and the conclusion of new agreements with
third parties. It is well known that the single market is by no means completed
(Marienello et al. 2015) and that intra-European borders still impose substan-
tial barriers to the movement of goods, services, and people within the continent
(Nitsch 2000). In 2014, the EU Parliament had commissioned a series of studies
(summarized by Pataki (2014)) on the cost of Non-Europe. These document the
consequences of market fragmentation and of the gaps and shortcomings in five
areas: the free movement of goods, the free movement of services, public procure-
ment, the digital economy, and the body of consumer law known as the consumer
acquis. Reducing frictions in these areas could increase intra-EU trade by 5% to
10%, depending on the member state.
So, if Europe wants to tap into the gains from trade promised by the forma-
tion of comprehensive trade agreements with third countries and keep centrifugal
forces within the EU at bay, strategies to tackle the remaining intra-EU impedi-
ments will be crucial.
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